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ERADICATING DISCRIMINATORY HOUSING PRACTICES:
THE ROLE OF DAMAGES AND THE DISCRIMINATORY
EFFECTS OF EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN FAIR
HOUSING LITIGATION
The barriers of housing discrimination stifle hope and achievement,
and promote rage and despair; they tell the Negro citizen trapped in
an urban slum there is no escape, that even were he able to get
decent education and a good job, he would still not have the freedom
other Americans enjoy to choose where he and his family will live.'
This statement, voiced during the floor debates on the Fair Housing

Act of 19682 (the "Act"), continues to be true as we approach the second
millennium. Although our Nation has made tremendous progress in eradicating racial barriers in public accommodations, employment and politics,
comparatively little effort has been exerted to eliminate discrimination
in housing. 3 America continues to grapple with the issue of how to
address discriminatory housing practices.
America is more physically segregated by race today, with respect to
housing, than at any time in the history of the Nation. 4 In considering

the battles for civil rights that have transpired over the last three decades,
housing discrimination remains immune to public policy initiatives and
civil rights enforcement. This social dilemma has prompted the introduction of various social policies intended to eradicate discrimination in
housing.'

This comment addresses the problem of discriminatory housing practices
and offer possible solutions for the elimination of such practices. Part
I outlines the history of housing discrimination and segregation and

1. S. 1358, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CoNG. REc. 2,274 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
2. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-19, 901, 82 Stat. 73, 81-9 (1968) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The Act is also referred to as "Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968." Section 3601 states "[it is the policy of the United States to
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 3601. Section 3604(a) declares that it shall be unlawful "to refuse to sell or rent after the making
of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin." Id. § 3604(a).
3. Note, The Legality of Integration Maintenance Quotas: Fair Housing or Forced Housing?,
55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 197, 198 (1989).
4. See id. at 198 n.4.
5. Id. at 199. For example, the commentator in this note suggests that the implementation of
integration maintenance quotas to assure racial integration in housing may be unconstitutional. Id.
This policy is driven by a desire to limit the "number of minorities permitted to enter a community
in order to achieve a mixed racial balance in housing." Id. Still other commentators suggest that
the development of land use controls to regulate gentrification displacement may be the answer to
the housing dilemma. See Note, Displacement in Gentrifying Neighborhoods: Regulating Condominium Conversion Through Municipal Land Use Controls, 63 B.U.L. REv. 955, 957 (1983).
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enactment of the Act, designed to mitigate discrimination and segregation.6
Part II lays out the specific changes to the Act in the Fair Housing
Amendment Act of 1988 ("FHAA"). 7 Specifically, part II examines the
FHAA's strenthened enforcement efforts and suggests using compensatory
damages as a means of eradicating housing discrimination.' Part III
explores the evidentiary standards establishing a violation of the Act and
the FHAA.9 Finally, part IV focuses on the discriminatory effects of
insurance redlining and how the Act can be used to combat this practice. 0
I.
A.

THE FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968

History of Housing Discrimination and Segregation

1. The Role of the Federal Government
Some commentators suggest that early federal housing efforts mandated
and encouraged segregation." "Suburban apartheid' ' 1 2 took root as the
Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") mortgage insurance programs,
during the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, 3 required obligatory
racially restrictive covenants, culminating in racially separate subdivisions.' 4 The FHA mortgage insurance program was "the most effective
master plan in American land use history"' 5 for racial segregation.
Further, separate but equal housing programs were established by both
Democratic and Republican administrations. Public housing programs,
war housing, and subsidized private housing programs, all "separate but
equal" were administered by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower. 16 The efforts of the subsequent administrations of Presidents
Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan, with respect to
patterns of public and subsidized housing site selections, resulted in
projects being located in either all-white suburbs or in the all-minority
central city.17 Such policies guaranteed segregated occupancy and increased
community segregation. 8 Since the Eisenhower administration, no president has aggressively pursued desegregation in public housing. 9

6. See infra notes 11-67 and accompanying text.
7. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982)).

8. See infra notes 68-133 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 134-77 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 178-227 and accompanying text.
11. Kushner, An Unfinished Agenda: The Federal FairHousing Enforcement Effort, 6 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 348, 350 (1988).
12. Id; see also Kushner, Apartheid in America: An Historicaland Legal Analysis of Contemporary
Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 How. L.J. 547 (1979).
13. Kushner, supra note 11, at 350.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.

17. Id. at 350-51.
18. Id. at 351.
19. Id.
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2. Agency Enforcement of Fair Housing Laws
The foremost impediment to effective federal fair housing enforcement
has been the general contempt directed towards integration and affirmative

action. 20 Moreover, Congress has been remiss in its obligation to provide

appropriate oversight of federal programs. 21 The Department of Housing

and Urban Development ("HUD") was established by Congress in 1965

to provide for the "sound development of the Nation's communities and

metropolitan areas." ' 22 During the Reagan Administration, HUD assumed

its traditional role as a mediator. In this capacity, HUD pursued voluntary
cooperation as opposed to zealously acting to enforce the fair housing
laws. 23 The stance taken by HUD exemplified the Reagan Administration's

hostility to supporting affirmative action integration. 24 One example of

this hostility can25be inferred from the decision in United States v. Starrett
City Associates.
In Starrett City the developer adopted a tenanting procedure to promote
and maintain a desired racial balance. 26 The procedure resulted in relatively
stable percentages of whites and minorities living in the housing development between 1975 and' 1987.27 In 1979, a group of black applicants
filed suit against Starrett. The applicants alleged that the tenanting procedures violated federal and state law by discriminating against them on

the basis of race. 28 The parties stipulated to a settlement in 1984. The

settlement decree provided that Starrett would make additional units

20. Id.
21. Id.at 352.
22. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Pub. L. No. 89-174, § 2, 79 Stat. 667
(1965), (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 3531 (1982)). To carry out this stated purpose HUD
is entrusted to:
assist the President in achieving maximum coordination of the various Federal
activities which have a major effect upon urban community, suburban, or metropolitan development; ... to encourage the maximum contributions that may be
made by vigorous private home building and mortgage lending industries to housing,
urban development, and the national economy;
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 3608(a) (1982) entrusting the authority and responsibility for administering
the Act in the Secretary of HUD.
23. Kushner, supra note 11, at 352.
24. Id. at 352-53. Kushner asserts that the Reagan Administration's hostility is apparent in its
rejection of HUD's conclusion that only testing can identify a pervasive scheme of discrimination.
Id. Moreover, this Administration and the Justice Department have consistently attempted to dismantle
programs designed to avoid community segregation. Id.
25. 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'g 660 F. Supp. 668 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 376 (1988).
26. Id. at 1098.
27. Id. The tenanting procedure used by the developers required applicants to complete a
preliminary information card. The card contained information indicating, inter alia, the applicant's
race or national origin, family composition, income and employment. Id. The rental office then
reviewed the applications and determined eligibility. Applicants that were found "preliminary eligible"
were placed in "the active file [where] separate records by race [were] maintained for apartment
sizes and income levels." Id. The applicants were informed that "no apartments [were] available,"
but they would be contacted when a unit became available. Id. Upon availability, applicants were
selected from the active file for final processing. Applicants of a race or national origin similar to
that of the previous "tenants [were] selected from the pool and offered apartments." Id.
28. Id.
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available each year for a five-year period
to black and minority applicants
29
depending on apartment availability.
In June of 1984, the government began an action against Starrett to
determine whether Starrett's policy and practice of limiting the number
of apartments available to minorities, in order to maintain a prescribed
degree of racial balance, was legal.30 The government contended that the
policies pursuant to renting discriminated against racial minorities in
3
violation of the Act. '
Starrett moved to dismiss the action taken by the government on the
basis that it had refused to intervene at the trial court level.3 2 The district
court denied the motion. 33 The government moved for summary judgment
following the period for taking discovery. Starrett made a cross-motion
for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the government. 34 Starrett appealed this decision. The Second
Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's judgment. 35 The court held
that "[h]ousing practices unlawful under Title VIII include not only those
motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose, but also those that disproportionately affect [sic] minorities. "36
The court reasoned that Starrett's allocation of public housing facilities,
based on racial quotas, resulted in denying applicants access to a unit,
otherwise available, solely because of race.37 Such denial produces a
"discriminatory effect" in violation of the Act.3 8 The court determined,
however, that "a race-conscious affirmative action plan does not necessarily violate federal constitutional or statutory provisions." 3 9 Moreover,
such plans cannot be "ageless in [its] reach into the past, and timeless
in [its] ability to affect the future." 4 A plan using distinctions based
on race "must be temporary in nature with a defined goal as its termination point.' '4 The court found that Starrett's use of ceiling quotas
failed to satisfy any of the criteria established in previous cases to support
"integration maintenance.' '42

29. Id.
30. Id. at 1099.
31. Id. The government claimed that Starrett had violated 42 U.S.C. section 3604(a)-(d). Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1100. Starrett maintained that the adopted tenanting procedures were intended "to
achieve and maintain integration and were not motivated by racial animus." Id. at 1099. Further,
the policies were adopted at the behest of the state. Id. The district court, however, accepted the
government's contention that Starrett's practices and policies, based on a "tipping formula,"
determined solely from race or national origin, indicated a clear violation of the Act. Id.
35. Id. at 1100.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1101.
Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)).

41. Id.

42. Id. at 1102. The court determined that Starrett's practices had only the goal of integration
maintenance. The quotas were already in effect for ten years and Starrett approximated that their
practices must continue at least fifteen more years. Id. Starrett also failed to adequately explain
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Starrett makes "a good faith attempt to develop an affirmative action
' 43 The
preferential admissions program to avoid community segregation.
Starrett decision, however, stands in contrast to the congressional mandate
to develop the Nation's communities and metropolitan areas in order to
promote the egalitarian ideals of diversity and integration.
The integration maintenance program in Starrett City, on the other
hand, resulted in "reverse discrimination." The tenanting procedure
'
"limit[ed] minority access to the very housing sought to be integrated.""
Yet, after the Starrett City decision, the Reagan Administration failed
to offer an alternative plan or policy initiative to either desegregate or
preserve the limited integrated living opportunities that exist .4
Further, HUD has embraced unrealistic "freedom-of-choice" policies
in its attempt to achieve integration consistent with the Justice Department's ideology." For example, HUD proposes: "1) creating magnet
projects with enhanced amenities; 2) providing race-neutral tenant transfers
to maximize desegregation; 3) providing buddy system transfers to projects
where the transferee is in the minority; 4) marketing projects to those
' 47 Finally, the
least likely to apply; and 5) improving project security.
caseloads of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice and
HUD are dominated by efforts to defend HUD's "practice[s] of administering public and subsidized housing and community development
programs on a racially segregative basis."8 As a result, historically,
housing providers failed to take the Act seriously. The initial lack of
"enforcement teeth" with respect to the amount of damages provided
by the courts for violations of the Act certainly contributed to the general
failure to take the Act seriously.
Compensatory Damages in Private Fair Housing Enforcement
(Pre-1988)
Since the effective date of the Act, 49 and prior to the enactment of
the FHAA,10 courts provided little guidance for assessing the amount of
damages to be awarded victims of housing discrimination.' This was
further complicated by the difficulty of measuring "noneconomic emoB.

how the approximation was reached. Id.Thus, such practices were not temporary. In addition, the
Court determined that Starrett had failed to show the "existence of prior racial discrimination or
discriminatory imbalance adversely affecting whites within Starrett City" or their other complexes.
Id.More importantly, the court determined that the quotas did not provide minorities with access
to Starrett City, but rather acted as a "ceiling" to their access. Id.
43. Kushner, supra note 11,at 353.
44. See Note, supra note 3, at 203 (discussing the constitutionality of integration maintenance
quotas).
45. Kushner, supra note Ii, at 353.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 353-54.
48. Id.at 354.
49. See supra note 2.
50. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982)).
51. Schwemm, Compensatory Damages In Federal Fair Housing Cases, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 83 (1981-82).
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tional harm" or other forms of "intangible injury" asserted by most

plaintiffs in fair housing litigation.12 The burden of proof, along with
the evidentiary standards for establishing a violation of the Act and the
amendment, is discussed later in this Article.53 The history of damage
awards in fair housing cases is set out below.
Under the.Act, private persons may initiate an action in court directly
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 3612. 54 In addition, an action can be
brought, following an initial administrative complaint to HUD, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. section 3610.15 Racial discrimination in housing also is
prohibited by section 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.16
The Act initially provided a $1,000 punitive damage limit as a form
of relief. 57 A section 1982 action, however, does not textually determine
the amount or nature of the relief to be granted.58 The Act and section
1982 are distinguished to the extent they allow recovery of court costs
and attorney's fees, and in the types of actions covered. 5 9 In any event,
a housing discrimination claim will sound in tort law generally and to
dignitary torts specifically. 60 The most apparent difficulties are identifying
what injuries are caused by a fair housing violation and the appropriate
monetary awards to compensate the victims. 6'
Tort law has traditionally been employed when assessing damages. In
order to assert a cause of action resulting from a dignitary tort the
plaintiff must show three elements: "1) economic loss; 2) emotional

52. Id. at 83-84.
53. See infra notes 134-77 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 2. Section 3612(a) allows private individuals to enforce their rights by "civil
actions in appropriate United States district courts without regards to the amount in controversy
and in appropriate State or local courts of general jurisdiction." This section was amended by the
FHAA and provided the plaintiff with more specific opportunities for election. See generally 42
U.S.C.A. § 3612(a) (West 1991).
55. See supra note 2. Section 3610(a) allows "[any person who claims to have been injured by
a discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory
housing practice that is about to occur . . . may file a complaint with the Secretary." This section
was also amended by the FHAA to provide more specific details on administrative enforcement.
See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610.
56. R.S. 1978, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1980)). Under section 1982
all citizens of the United States have the same right, "as is enjoyed by white citizens" to "inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." Id.
57. Section 3612(c) provides:
the court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary
injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, and may award to the
plaintiff actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive damages, together with
court costs and reasonable attorney fees in the case of a prevailing plaintiff: Provided,
that the said plaintiff in the opinion of the court is not financially able to assume
said attorney's fees.
This section was substantially changed by the 1988 amendment (FHAA). See infra notes 68-127
and accompanying text.
58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982 provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and covey real and personal property.
59. Schwemm, supra note 51, at 87.
60. Id. at 90.
61. Id.
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distress and other harm to the plaintiff's personality, and 3) loss of

rights." 62 The three elements have been "judicially recognized" as an
appropriate basis for an award of compensatory damages. 63 Each of the
three elements, however, presents varying degrees of difficulty for assessing

damages." That is, economic loss is the least difficult to calculate while
calculating damages for emotional injury and loss of right are more
problematic. 65 One commentator suggests that calculating such damages
amounts to no more than a "guessing game."
Thus, in the beginning, the Act proved to be an inadequate enforcement
mechanism. Moreover, enforcement by private law suits failed because
damage awards were generally too low to justify the cost of bringing

suit. 67 Enforcement mechanisms were strengthened by the FHAA.
II.
A.

THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENT ACT OF 1988 (FHAA)

Strengthening Enforcement Efforts
Since 1977, Congress has strengthened the Act by establishing a sig-

nificant federal enforcement arm. 68 It recognized that the Act was constructed without "enforcement teeth." '69 The original Act seriously limited
damages and attorney's fees. 70 Private use of the Act was discouraged

while no significant public enforcement mechanism existed to fill the

concerns prompted the 1988 amendment to the Act, the
void. 7' These
72
FHAA.

62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1973) (damages, in cases
involving housing discrimination, are not limited to out-of-pocket losses and may include an award
for emotional distress and humiliation.)); see also Seaton v. Sky Realty Co. 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th
Cir. 1974) (court decided the case solely on the element of emotional distress, awarding $500 for
embarrassment and humiliation); Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 27, 32
(D.S.C. 1978) (court awarded $5,000 for loss of civil rights as well as $2,000 for emotional distress
for discrimination suffered in attempting to inspect a house).
64. Schwemm, supra note 51, at 93.
65. Id. at 93-94.
66. Id. at 94. This commentator proposes that "presumed damages" should be the case in fair
housing litigation. The doctrine of presumed damages allows a plaintiff to recover damages based
on the "inherent nature of the wrong." Id. at 96. The doctrine requires two conditions to be met
before the court can award damages. First, damages, may be presumed to flow from a fair housing
violation because "serious, intangible injuries are likely to result from such a tort." Id. at 101.
Second, damages may be presumed because the injuries alleged are difficult to prove. Id. The use
of presumed damages was suggested given the wide range of awards for this type of tortious injury.
Id.
67. Id. at 104; see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 267 (1978) (an award of nominal damages
should not exceed one dollar).
68. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair
Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1087 (1989).
69. Id.
70. Id.at 1079.
71. Id. at 1087.
72. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982)).
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1. Changes in Procedure
a. Modifications in the Administrative Process
The most meaningful reform in fair housing law has been the modification of the administrative process under section 3610 of the FHAA.7 3
The complainant, just as under the original law, can file an administrative
complaint. Such complaints will be referred to a state or local government
agency only if that agency's program has been certified by HUD. In
addition, the state or local government laws must be "substantially
equivalent" to the Act. 74 Under the FHAA, if no certified agency exists
in that locality, HUD can refer the matter to the Justice Department if
a "pattern and practice of illegal behavior is presented." ' 7
Voluntary conciliation was the typical means of resolving a dispute
between the parties under the Act. In situations where the respondent
refused to participate or failed to agree to a resolution of the complaint,
the only recourse by HUD was to inform the complainant of his or her
76
right to sue in court.
The amended section 3610 now allows the complainant or HUD to
file a complaint. 77 The complainant is now given one year rather than
the previous 180 days. After the filing of a complaint, HUD has 100
days to complete an investigation. HUD is also authorized by the new
law to issue subpoenas and provide for witness fees. 78 In addition, failure
to appear and testify can lead to up to one year imprisonment and a
fine of up to one hundred thousand dollars. 79 These damages also apply
to the falsification of documents 8 and the alteration or destruction of
8I
evidence .
At this time, after the filing of a complaint, conciliation must begin.
The issue may call for the matter to be referred to arbitration. 2 HUD
has the option of dismissing the complaint or filing a charge if the matter
is not resolved through conciliation. If the complainant has brought
federal suit under section 3613 and the trial has commenced, HUD is
precluded from issuing a charge.83 Zoning disputes, however, are submitted
to the Justice Department for litigation. 4 HUD also has the option to
order prompt Justice Department litigation in cases where interim relief,
such as an injunction, is necessary to protect the rights of the complainant .8

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1968).
Id.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C.A. § 3610; see Kushner, supra note 68, at 1088.
42 U.S.C.A. § 361 1(a), (b).
Id. § 3611(c).
Id. § 3611(c)(2)(A)(B).
Id. § 3611(c)(2)(C).
See Kushner, supra note 68, at 1088.
42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(b); see Kushner, supra note 68, at 1088-89.
42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(g)(2)(C); see Kushner, supra note 68, at 1089.
42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(e) & (g); see Kushner, supra note 68, at 1089.
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Other substantial procedural changes include amending section 3612(a),
which allows HUD enforcement through litigation,86 and section 3612(g)(3)17
which authorizes penalties of up to ten thousand dollars for the first
discriminatory practice and twenty-five thousand dollars if the respondent
has been adjudged to have committed a violation during the five-year
period ending on the date the charge was filed. In addition, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") can assess damages up to fifty thousand
dollars if there has been two or more adjudged violations in the past
seven years."8
The ALJ may also assess attorney fees to prevailing parties under
section 3612(p). 9 The Secretary of HUD has thirty days to review the
ALJ's findings. 9° The final order is also reviewable within thirty days
from the decision 9' or the ruling may be enforced by the United States
Court of Appeals.92 The ALJ's findings are deemed conclusive and final
after forty-five days from the date the order was entered if no petition
for judicial review is filed. 9
A conclusive finding by the ALJ binds subsequently filed HUD petitions
for enforcement. If HUD fails to petition to enforce the ALJ's order
within sixty days, and if no party files a petition to review the order,
anyone entitled to relief, without time limitation, may file a petition in
the Court of Appeals to enforce the order.9 All orders dismissing charges
must be disclosed publicly. 95 Additionally, HUD may seek enforcement
96
of conciliation agreement violations from the Justice Department. It is
also compelled to notify state licensing agencies when licensed real estate
professionals, lenders, or any other licensed businesses have been adjudged
to have participated in discriminatory practices. 97
b. Private Enforcement in Federal Court
Under the prior law, section 3612 provided for enforcement by private
persons.98 This new section 3613 replaces the old one and permits a two86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612(a). The respondent, complainant, or other aggrieved party on whose
behalf the claim is asserted has twenty days to elect to have the matter determined in federal court
in order to protect the party's right to a jury trial. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612. After an
election is made an administrative law judge ("AL") must commence the hearing within 120 days
of the filing of the charge. A decision must be issued within 60 days of the conclusion of the
hearing. Discovery is permitted and the hearings are subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
ALJ may not proceed to resolve the matter if a private lawsuit has also been commenced under
applicable state law or section 3613. Id.
87. Id. § 3612(g)(3). The ALJ, after finding a violation of the law may award actual damages,
injunctive and other equitable relief. Civil penalties may be assessed against the violator. See generally
id. § 3612.
88. The time limits are not applicable where the violator is an individual repeat offender as
contrasted with a different employee of the same offending organization. Id. § 1090.
89. Id.

90. Id. § 3612(h)(1).
91. Id. § 3612(i)(2). Venue is in the circuit where the discriminatory housing practice is alleged
to have transpired. Id. § 3610(d).
92. Id. § 3612(j).
93. Id. § 3612(l).
94. Id. § 3612(m).
95. Id. § 3612(g)(7).

96. Id. § 3610(c).
97. Id. § 3612(g)(5).
98. Id.§ 3612(a).
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year statute of limitations rather than the previous 180 days. 99 Moreover,
the two years do not include any periods when administrative proceedings
were pending under sections 3610 and 3612. I00 As under the previous
law, a section 3613 action may be commenced even if a section 3610
administrative complaint has been filed with HUD.' 01 Once the complainant consents to a section 3610 HUD, state, or locally obtained
conciliation agreement, however, the section 3613 action is barred. 0 2
Private litigation is also barred under section 3613 once a section 3612
hearing before an ALJ has commenced on the record. 0 3 The Attorney
General is permitted to intervene in section 3613 proceedings after timely
certification that the case is of general public importance.' °4 In addition,
an attorney for the complainant can be appointed by a federal judge in
section 3613 cases. 05 The federal judge can also waive fees, costs and
security if the complainant is financially unable to incur such cost. I'0
Furthermore, the judge may also award unlimited actual and punitive
damages. Injunctive relief, including orders for affirmative action also
is permitted. 0 7 The court may permit award of attorney's fees. 08 Private
litigants, who are bona fide purchasers, tenants, or encumbrancers, without notice of the administrative complaint or litigation, are not restrained
by injunctive orders interfering with their real estate transaction.' l 9 This
is also the case in administrative proceedings. Commentators and practitioners recognize that the original law is dramatically improved by the
above changes."10
c. Litigation in the Federal Forum
The Justice Department, under section 3614, which replaces what was
previously section 3613, is permitted to pursue "pattern or practice"
litigation. In addition, the Justice Department is entrusted with the authority to enforce conciliation agreements."' Such an action may be filed
when the Attorney General reasonably believes that any person or group
of persons is involved in a "pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of any rights granted" by the FHAA." 2 The new law, unlike
the previous law, subjects pattern or practices cases to a statute of
limitations." 3 Civil actions may be brought no later than eighteen months

99. Id. § 3613(a)(1)(A).
100. Id. § 3612(a)(1)(B). The tolling does not apply to actions resulting from a breach of a
conciliation agreement.
101. Id. § 3613(a)(2).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 3613(a)(3).
104. Id. § 3613(e).
105. Id. § 3613(b)(1).
106. Id. § 3613(b)(2).
107. Id. § 3 613(c).
108. Id. § 3612(p), 3613(c)(2).
109. Id. § 3613(d).
110. Id; see Kushner, supra note 68, at 1091.
111. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3614(a).
112. Id.
113. Id. § 3614(b)(1)(B).
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"after the date of the occurrence or the termination of the alleged
4
discriminatory housing practice."" Moreover, actions for breach of conciliatory agreements must be brought within ninety days."'
The FHAA also authorizes the Attorney General to enforce subpoenas
under section
on HUD's behalf." 6 Actions by the Justice Department,
7 and damages to
injunctions"
of
form
the
3614, can provide relief in
aggrieved persons. " ' The Justice Department can also provide civil relief
violation
by assessing penalties of up to fifty thousand dollars for the first
9 Aggrieved
violations."
subsequent
for
dollars
and one hundred thousand
parties may also be allowed by the courts to intervene in section 3614
proceedings. 20 In addition, attorney's fees may be awarded 2to parties
other than the Justice Department or other federal agencies. '
2. Changes in Coverage
The major changes in coverage, promulgated in the FHAA, include
extensions in coverage to persons with disabilities,'1 and to families with
children. 123 Furthermore, the FHAA now expressly covers real estate loans
for repairs and improvement. 24 The FHAA also reaches secondary lending
appraisals. 25
practices such as bias in loan-based securities and real estate
Moreover, the FHAA expands the definition of "aggrieved" to include
persons who believe they "will ' 26be injured by a discriminatory housing27
in addition to already injured parties.
practice that is about to occur,'
Claims alleging interference, coercion, or intimidation may be vindicated
through HUD administrative proceedings as well as through the previously
allowed course of private civil litigation.
3. Modifications in Administration
New provisions for recognizing state and local equivalent fair housing
laws are included in the FHAA. That is, agencies with interim referral
certification are considered certified during the first forty months following
passage of the FHAA. 28 Additionally, each jurisdiction is given the same
period of time, with a possible extension of eight months, in which to

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. § 3614(b)(2)(B).
Id. § 3614(c).
Id. § 3614(d)(I)(A).
Id. § 3614(d)(1)(B).
Id. § 3614(d)(1)(C).
Id. § 3614(e).
Id. § 3614(d)(2).
Id. § 3604(0.
Id. §§ 3604(a)-(e), 3605, 3606, 3631.
Id. § 3605(b)(1)(A).
Id.§ 3605(b)(2).
Id. § 3602(i)(2).
Id. § 3602(i)(1).
Id. § 3610(f)(4).
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amend its laws or regulations to obtain substantial equivalency. 29 Certification is reconsidered every five years. 30
The FHAA authorizes the Secretary of HUD to issue implementing
regulations.' 3' The Secretary also must submit an annual report to Congress
addressing complaints, investigations and hearings under the administrative
enforcement provisions.' Moreover, the report must contain information
with respect to participation of protected minorities in HUD administered
programs. 33
The most significant changes in the Act are with respect to the administrative process. Specifically, bringing suit has been facilitated by the
FHAA. The increase in damage awards, in conjunction with the new
authority granted HUD and the Justice Department by the FHAA, may
provide the impetus needed to enforce the fair housing laws effectively.
Enforcement, however, will also depend upon the ability of complainants
to present their cases in court.
III.

PROPER EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN FAIR HOUSING
LITIGATION
Once a valid cause of action under the FHAA is established, the issue
of the proper evidentiary standard necessary to sustain a violation arises.
Section 3604(a) provides that any act which has the effect of making
unavailable or denying "a dwelling to any person because of his race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin" is prohibited.'' 4
The "because of race" language is problematic. The United States
Courts of Appeals disagree on the meaning of the broad language contained within section 3604(a). 3 1 These conflicting interpretations have
resulted in the emergence of three general evidentiary standards. 136
A.

Possible Evidentiary Standards

1. The Discriminatory Purpose Standard
The first evidentiary standard is the discriminatory purpose standard
adopted in Boyd v. Lefrak Organization.' This standard requires the
plaintiff to show "an intentional discriminatory motive behind the de-

129. Id.
130. Id. § 3610(f)(5).
131. Id. § 3614(a).
132. Id. § 3608(e)(2).
133. Id. § 3608(e)(6).
134. Id. § 3604(a).
135. Comment, Application of Title VIII to Insurance Redlining, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 472, 491
(1980).
136. Id. The Comment examines these evidentiary standards in the context of insurance redlining.
That commentator advocates for the application of the discriminatory effects standards. This comment,
however, contends that this standard should be applied to FHAA cases generally, especially given
the language used in section 3604(a) (i.e. "any act which has the effect").
137. 509 F.2d [110 (2d Cir. 1975).
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fendant's adoption of the facially neutral criteria which have produced
the discriminatory effects."''
In Boyd, the defendant Lefrak required certain financial criteria to
determine eligibility for. tenancy in their apartments. The plaintiffs were
assistance. Lefrak rejected Boyd's application
black recipients of public
39
to rent an apartment.
The Justice Department initially commenced an action under the Act
to prevent Lefrak "from continuing an alleged pattern and practice of
resistance to the statute."' 14 Boyd later moved to intervene in the original

action. '4'

The court of appeals concluded that Lefrak's seemingly neutral rule
42 The court restated
was not implemented to exclude a racial minority.
may have a
that "[tihe mere fact that a requirement, otherwise proper,
43
invalid."'
it
render
not
does
greater impact on the poor,
The court in Boyd concluded that no discriminatory purpose existed.
Lefrak's purpose, in applying the rule, was to "seek assurance that
prospective tenants will be able to meet their rental responsibilities."'"
By applying the discriminatory purpose standard the plaintiff's burden,
as in this case, is substantially greater. Furthermore, this standard requires
the plaintiff prove the subjective intent of the defendant.
The Balancing Approach
The third standard calls for a balancing approach on a case-by-case
basis.' 5 In Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,'"4 the plaintiffs sought to compel the defendants "to
rezone plaintiffs' property to permit the construction of federally financed
low-cost housing. ' 4 Metropolitan asserted that the refusal to allow
rezoning by Arlington Heights was racially discriminatory. The issue before
the court of appeals was whether the refusal to rezone violated the Act.'"
The court of appeals held that "under some circumstances a violation
of section 3604(a) can be established by a, showing of discriminatory
' 49 The court of appeals
effect without a showing of discriminatory intent."
proceeded to look at four factors to determine if discriminatory effect,
without proof of discriminatory purpose, was sufficient to establish a
violation of section 3604(a). The four factors were:
2.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Comment, supra note 135, at 491.
Boyd, 509 F.2d at 1111.
Id. at 1112.
Id.
Id.at 1113.
Id. (quoting English v. Town of Huntington, 448 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1971)).
Id. at 1114.
Comment, supra note 135, at 492.
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
Id.at 1285.
Id.
Id.at 1290.
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(1) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2)
is there some evidence of discriminatory intent though not enough to
satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis [426 U.S.
229 (1976)]; (3) what is the defendant's interest in taking the action
complained of; and (4) does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant
to affirmatively provide housing for members of minority groups or
merely to restrain the defendant from interfering with individual
property owners who wish to provide such housing.' 5 0
The court of appeals concluded that the discriminatory effect in this
case was relatively weak. 5 ' It determined that the second criterion was
the least important of the four factors.'5 2 The court decided that the
evidence of intent constituted an insufficient basis on which to grant
relief. '
The court found the third factor to be important. This factor hinges
upon whether the defendant is a private individual(s) or a governmental
entity. The court determined that if the individual is seeking to protect
private rights, the courts could not be "overly solicitous when the effect
is to perpetuate segregated housing."' 54 On the other hand, the court
determined that if the defendant is a governmental entity. "acting within
the ambit of legitimately derived authority," it would be less likely to
find that its actions violated the Act.' 55 Arlington Heights acted within
the scope of its authority to zone granted by state law. 5 6
The final criterion related to the nature of the relief the plaintiff
sought. The court reasoned that it "ought to be more reluctant to grant
relief when the plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to construct
integrated housing or take affirmative steps to ensure that integrated
housing is built than when the plaintiff is attempting to build integrated
housing on his own land . . . ."I" The court found that this factor favored
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs owned the land on which they wanted to
build low-income housing. After balancing all four factors, the court
remanded the case to determine if there was any land within Arlington
Heights, other than the plaintiffs' property, that was both properly zoned
and suitable for federally subsidized low-income housing.'
The standard used in this case, as in the majority of decisions where
a case-by-case analysis is adopted, provides little direction to the parties
as to how to prepare or defend their cases. Such an approach leads to
arbitrary decisions due to the subjective nature of each of the factors
considered.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at

1291.
1292.
1293.

1294.
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3. The Discriminatory Effect Standard
The plaintiff's burden of proof is made considerably lighter under the
discriminatory effect standard. This third evidentiary standard was invoked
in United States v. Mitchell.'59 The plaintiff only has to establish that
the "defendant's actions or use of facially neutral criteria have a racially
discriminatory effect which the defendant is unable to prove was justified
by nonracial considerations." ' 160 This approach also is referred to as the
"prima facie case" standard because the burden of proof is shifted to
the defendant once the plaintiff has established its initial case. The plaintiff
must also demonstrate that the6 discriminatory effect emanates from the
defendant's action or criteria.' '
In Mitchell the Attorney General sued the defendant, Mitchell, his real
estate company, and his agents, seeking damages and an injunction to
62 The district court granted
end racially discriminatory housing practices.
the injunction after determining that Mitchell had3 "steered" blacks into
6
a separate section of a large apartment complex. The Attorney General
appealed the district court's refusal to permit the government to recover
damages for the injured parties.'6
The court of appeals agreed with the reasoning of the district court
finding that the government proved a pattern or practice of discrimination
65
in violation of section 3604(a) of the Act. The court of appeals concluded
that "[tihe fact that a large majority of Mitchell's black tenants were
clustered in a defined area was highly probative of a § 3604(a) violation."' 6 Moreover, the court of appeals held that "a significant disis sufficient to demonstrate
criminatory effect flowing from rental decisions
' 67
Act.'
Housing
Fair
the
of
a violation
The court of appeals relied upon Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. The court of appeals determined that "[c]onduct that has the
necessary and foreseeable consequence of perpetuating segregation can
be as deleterious as purposefully discriminatory conduct in frustrating
1
the national commitment [to fair housing]." '8 The court of appeals
concluded that the district court's decision, "based on statistical evidence
and evidence of actions that effectively confined blacks to a section of

159. 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978).
160. Comment, supra note 135, at 492. The Comment notes that other commentators argue that
the discriminatory effects standard should be applied only in title VIII cases brought against
governmental entities due to the more harmful impact on the victims as contrasted with private
discriminatory acts. Id. at 491-92 n.155. The Comment rejects this conclusion based on both case
law and the legislative history of the Act. Id. at 492 n.155.
161. Id.
162. Mitchell, 580 F.2d at 790.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 791.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283
(7th Cir. 1977)).
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the complex," was
consistent with the requirements of the Act, specifically
69
section 3604(a).
With respect to the damage claim, the court of appeals determined
that the Attorney General had wrongly interpreted section 3613.170 The
court of appeals held that this section of the Act did not grant the
Attorney General the authority to seek legal damages. 7 ' The court of
appeals, however, declined to review the amount of costs awarded by
72
the district court.
This commentator contends that the standard applied in Mitchell should
be extended to discriminatory housing cases generally. This standard is
routinely applied in title VII employment cases. 73 The same standard
should also apply to discriminatory housing cases as well.
The arguments made to support this conclusion are: (1) the similar
language and broad purposes of the statutes should be construed similarly;
(2) the broad statutory construction generally given to the Act in order
to effectuate its purpose; (3) indications from the legislative history
suggesting that the Act was intended to extend beyond simply prohibiting
discriminatory purpose; and (4) a concern with the self-perpetuating
discriminatory effects of de facto segregation which suggest a more
pervasive need to eradicate such effects regardless of intent. 74
Moreover, it is suggested that several additional arguments support the
application of this standard to these types of cases. First, it is difficult,
if not impossible, to document proof of the subjective intent of any
defendant, especially in relation to large corporations, as is the case in
the majority of housing discrimination claims. 75 Second, the defendant
in fair housing cases is generally in a better position to prove the lack
of discriminatory intent. The defendant should be required to establish
a proper justification for any facially neutral criteria that produces discriminatory effect. 76 Simply, the defendant, with greater access to information regarding his operations and motivations, should be required
to demonstrate the reasons for his behavior.' 77
IV.

INSURANCE REDLINING AND THE ACT

A.

Defining the Problem
Generally, redlining is "credit discrimination based upon the characteristics of the neighborhood surrounding the borrower's dwelling.' 7 8

169. Id.
170. Id. at 792.
171. Id. at 793.
172. Id. at 794.
173. Comment, supra note 135, at 493.
174. Id. at 494.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 494-95.
177. Id. at 495.
178. Note, Insurance Redlining & The Fair Housing Act: The Lost Opportunity of Mackey v.
Nationwide Insurance Companies, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 563 (1985).
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More specifically, redlining is defined as "those lending practices that
constitute arbitrary denials of financing based on geographic location,
justified
racial or ethnic considerations, or any consideration which is not
79
on the basis of legitimate, demonstrable economic criteria.'
Insurance redlining is related to the practice of mortgage redlining.
Mortgage redlining is directly prohibited by the Act. 180 Section 3605
provides that it is unlawful for financial institutions to deny a loan or
other financial assistance for the purpose of "purchasing, constructing,
improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling ... because of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin."'' Insurance redlining results in
the unavailability of home mortgages because most lenders never loan
money for mortgages without the property being insured. 8 2 The importance of insurance, as a prerequisite to purchase, is acknowledged in
Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity Mid-American Fire and Casualty Co..183
The Dunn Decision
The plaintiffs in Dunn were black homeowners residing in a predominantly black neighborhood. In 1955, they procured homeowner's insurance from defendant Midwestern through defendant Borchers Insurance
Company, an agent of Midwestern. 81 4 Midwestern notified the black
homeowners and informed them that their coverage would be maintained
until December of 1977. Midwestern chose not to extend coverage beyond
this date. It alleged that nonrenewal of the policies was based on its
decision to terminate Borchers' business portfolio.'85 Midwestern advised
86
the black homeowners to obtain coverage under the Ohio FAIR plan.
The black homeowners asserted that Midwestern's decision to terminate
Borchers' business portfolio was because the portfolio included "a significant portion of black homeowners and/or persons residing in predominantly black neighborhoods." 8 7 They further charged that this practice
88
amounted to "insurance redlining" that is prohibited by the Act.1
B.

179. Id. at 564 n.l. The concept has been defined as the "discriminatory refusal to issue
homeowner's insurance irrespective of the property in question and the qualifications of the applicant."
Id. at 566.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1982).
181. Id. The FHAA prohibits such discrimination on the basis of the enumerated classes of people
with the inclusion of "handicap" and "familial status." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3605(a).
182. Note, supra note 178, at 566.
183. 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
184. Id.at 1107.
185. Id.
186. Id. State Fair plans are primarily the product of the Hughes Commission Report. See THE
PRESIDENT'S NAT'L ADVISORY PANEL ON.INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS, MEETING THE INSURANCE

CRISIS OF OUR Crrms (1968). The foundation for such plans was laid by the Urban Property Insurance
Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968 ("UPIPRA"), Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XI, 82 Stat. 555
(current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701s, 1709, 1735d, 1749bbb to 1749bbb-21 and in scattered sections

of 42 U.S.C. §§ 5 and 15, (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The report was "undertaken because of the
insurance availability problems resulting from the riots and demonstrations of the 1960's." Comment,
Application of Title VIII to Insurance Redlining, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 472, 489 (1980).
The UPIPRA was enacted'to provide protection to private insurance companies from the risk of
catastrophic losses that accompanied riots or civil disorders. Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1111.
187. Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1107.
188. Id.
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Midwestern responded by asserting "that Congress ha[d] considered
the problems of insurance redlining and acted by passage of the McCarran
Act, Urban Property and Protection Reinsurance Act of 1968 and the
state FAIR plans."'8 9 Additionally, Midwestern contended that neither
the language of the Act nor the legislative history indicated that Congress
intended to include insurance redlining.' 90
The district court treated Midwestern's 12(b)(6) motion as a motion
for summary judgment.' 9 ' The motion was denied. Midwestern moved
"to exclude all extraneous material and decide, as a matter of law,
whether plaintiffs have stated a claim" under the Act. 192 The district
court considered individually each claim asserted by the black homeowners
under the Act.' 93
The district court determined that "[slince a discriminatory denial of
financing violates § 3604(a), a discriminatory failure or refusal to provide
property insurance on dwellings also must violate § 3604(a)."'9 The court
reasoned that "the availability of appropriate insurance is a necessary
predicate to the availability of financing, and financial assistance is a
precondition to securing the availability of adequate housing."' 95 Furthermore, the court reasoned that because insurance is a precondition to
adequate housing, a discriminatory denial of insurance precludes a person
who is economically able from buying a house.'9 As a result, "although
insurance redlining is not expressly proscribed by the Act, it is encompassed by both the broad language of section 3604(a) and the legislative
design of the Act . . . ."97
The court further determined that section 3605 did not contemplate
prohibiting insurance redlining by an insurance company not engaged in
making commercial real estate loans. 98 The court declined to decide the
other alleged violations because Midwestern's conduct was already found
to be violative of section 3604.199
C.

The Mackey Analysis: The Escaped Opportunity to Expand the
Act
The decision in Dunn should have settled the issue of whether insurance
redlining was prohibited by the Act. In Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance
Co.,200 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

189. Id. at 1108; see also supra text accompanying note 185.
190. Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1108.
191. Id. at 1107.

192. Id.
193. Id.at 1108-12. The black homeowners charged that insurance redlining by Midwestern
constituted a violation of sections 3604, 3605, and 3617 of the Act. Id.
194. Id. at 1109.
195. Id.

196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1110.
1109.
1110.
llll.

200. 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).
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Circuit reached a different conclusion. In this case, the black plaintiff,
Mackey, brought an action alleging that his former employer, Nationwide,
had discriminated against him on the basis of his race. Nationwide
terminated Mackey's contract as an insurance agent. 201
Mackey also complained of his former employer's alleged practice of
redlining. 2 2 Further, Mackey "alleged that he had suffered economic
harm because of his inability to sell or renew policies insuring the houses
of black friends and business acquaintances." 203
Nationwide filed a 12(b)(6) motion in the district court. 2°4 The court
dismissed the complaint with respect to the alleged redlining practice. 2 5
The court ruled that the remaining allegations also failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Further, the court determined that
Mackey lacked standing to assert any of the claims because he "was not
a member of the class of policy holders or potential insureds who were
harmed by the redlining practice.' '207 The court also held that insurance
redlining was not prohibited by the Act. 2° The court entered a judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).20 The Fourth Circuit allowed
an immediate appeal. The court of appeals did not adopt the reasoning
210
of the district court in toto, but affirmed the dismissal of the claims.
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the McCarranFerguson Act precluded the Sherman Act claim. It disagreed, however,
with the district court's conclusion that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
foreclosed the claim under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 and
the Fair Housing Act. 21 ' The court of appeals held that "[u]nless a federal
statute specifically relates to the business of insurance, the McCarranFerguson Act provides that 'no act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any state for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance. ' ' 2 2 The court of appeals
noted that Nationwide failed to point to any law enacted in the state

201. Id. at 420.
202. Id. The court defined redlining "as the arbitrary refusal to underwrite the risks of persons
residing in predominantly black neighborhoods." Id. Mackey asserted that the redlining practices
were in violation of various federal and state statutes including the Fair Housing Amendment Act.
Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. The district judge ruled that the McCarran-Ferguson Act protected the "alleged redlining
practices from challenges under the Sherman Act, the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Acts."
Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. The court further determined that even if insurance redlining was prohibited by the Act,
Mackey's claim was also barred by the statute of limitations. Id. The pendent claim under the
state's Unfair Trade Practices Act was dismissed because it was "inadequately related to the plaintiff's
remaining claims of direct discrimination against himself." Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.

212. Id. at 421 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012(b) (West 1976)).
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that would be impaired by application of the Fair Housing Act or the
Civil Rights Acts.213 The court of appeals concluded that barring these
types of claims would be "unnecessary to the effectuation of the congressional goals in enacting McCarran-Ferguson, insuring that the states
retain the power to regulate the business of insurance and providing
regulited insurance companies with a limited exemption from the antitrust
laws.'

214

The court of appeals proceeded to address the standing issue. It determined that the district court was correct in concluding that Mackey
had no standing to attack Nationwide's alleged redlining practice under
the Civil Rights Acts. 2 5 The court of appeals ruled that "[a] racially
discriminatory refusal to insure houses in predominantly black neighborhoods may give a cause of action under those two sections to the
homeowners, the direct victims of racial discrimination. ' 21 6 Thus, since
Mackey did not claim to be a victim and had no personal stake in the
outcome, he had no standing to assert a cause of action. Mackey's only
claim was that he had lost opportunities to sell property insurance to
black friends and acquaintances.27
The court of appeals concluded, however, that Mackey did have standing
to challenge the alleged redlining practice under the Act, specifically
sections 3604 and 3617.21 With respect to the section 3604 claim, the
court held that this section does not prohibit the alleged hazard insurance
redlining practice. 21 9 The court of appeals concluded that if section 3604
was designed to extend to every discriminatory act that could possibly
affect the availability of housing, the specific proscriptions of section
3605 of discrimination in the provision of financing would have been
superfluous.2 20
The court of appeals noted that Congress was aware of the problem
of unavailability of hazard insurance when it enacted the Act in 1968.
To address this problem it enacted the Urban Property Protection and
Reinsurance Act of 1968.221 The court of appeals concluded by pointing
out that several bills to amend the Act, so as to proscribe discriminatory
practices in the hazard insurance industry, were never adopted. 222 The
failure of the proposed amendments buttressed the court's reasoning that
the statute as enacted in 1968 was not intended to reach the hazard
insurance industry. 223

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982.

216. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 421.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 422.

219. Id. at 423.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 424.
222. Id.
223. Id. The court of appeals dismissed the pendent state claim since all of the other federal
claims attacking the alleged redlining practice were properly dismissed. Id. at 425. Mackey's claim
of direct discrimination was left intact and remained viable. Id.
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The court of appeals in Mackey rejected Dunn as a basis for interpreting
the Act to prohibit insurance redlining. 224 The analytical framework of
Dunn was completely ignored by the court in Mackey. One commentator
suggests that Mackey "suffers from analytical myopia. ' 225 The decision
in Mackey is "a judicial construction vastly out of step, in both temperament and analysis, with the majority of federal courts today. ' 226 The
Fourth Circuit's construction of the Act effectively sanctions the continued
unavailability of housing based on discrimination2 27by refusing to include
insurance redlining within the scope of the Act.
In both Dunn and Mackey the courts partially based their decisions
on the failure of Congress to pass several amendments to the Act. Such
amendments could have provided the basis for better enforcement. Although the Act has been subsequently amended by the FHAA, the practice
of insurance redlining continues to subvert efforts to eradicate discriminatory housing practices. In order to address this problem it is essential
that Congress revisit the Act and provide additional changes. Until Congress acts, insurance redlining remains as a barrier to the total elimination
of discrimination and housing segregation. The future of fair housing
depends upon Congress and the courts adequately addressing this issue.
V.

CONCLUSION

The FHAA is considered the "most significant civil rights enactment
in a generation." 228 This amendment to the original Act provides the
effective enforcement mechanism necessary to keep our fair housing laws
viable. The damages and attorney's fees available through the FHAA
should entice attorneys to litigate such cases.
Moreover, publicity and reported cases should encourage more involvement from the bar and increase awareness to potential victims as
well as provide a deterrent to real estate professionals. 229 Private enforcement and affirmative action in pursuit of integration are facilitated
by aggressive enforcement. Success of the amendment, however, depends
upon the efforts of the federal administration to provide leadership in
eradicating discrimination in housing and promoting diversity and equality.
Congress can facilitate matters by revisiting the Act and directly proscribing the practice of insurance redlining.
Furthermore, the courts can play an important role in achieving policy
initiatives. The Fourth Circuit has effectively sanctioned the continued
unavailability of housing to minorities by refusing to include insurance
redlining within the scope of the Act. Other circuits are not duty-bound

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Note, supra note 178, at 591.
Id.at 592.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Kushner, supra note 68, at 1096.
Id. at 1096-97.

592

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

to follow the Fourth Circuit's lead. Courts can promote the goals of the
Act by interpreting the Act's broad language as including the practice
of insurance redlining. Finally, courts should apply the discriminatory
effect standard in fair housing cases. Such a standart affords victims a
greater chance to prove that discrimination exists.
A partnership between the Congress, Administration, and courts can
result in the eradication of discriminatory patterns and practices. All
three branches of government, however, must cooperate to make the
American dream come true for everyone regardless of minority status.
JOHNNIE SCOTT JR.

